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ABSTRACT
A growing number of academics have suggested U.S. corporate
governance laws bestow too much power on managers. Much of the
research focuses on the relationship between corporate governance
arrangements, which supply a means to managerial power, and the financial
performance of corporations.
This exclusive focus on financial
performance may be misguided. Although profits serve as a proxy for the
benefits corporations provide society, they do not always adequately reflect
the costs of the activities that generated them. In this sense, financial
performance may not give an accurate, or at least complete, picture of the
real value of corporations. Whether managers are too entrenched by the
laws of corporate governance, therefore, depends not only on their
profitability but also on how they spend their discretion. Importantly,
entrenched managers could use their discretion to sacrifice profits in the
public interest. Building on prior research, this Article compares six
entrenching governance provisions with the appearance of corporations on
two investment indexes based on “social responsibility,” a measurement of
performance along environmental, social and alternative economic factors.
The results confirm a social psychological hypothesis of the Article:
entrenchment–as measured by the presence of these six provisions–was
negatively, and significantly, related to inclusion in the indexes. Although I
offer competing explanations in addition to the hypothesis, the results
tentatively support the conclusion that certain corporate governance
arrangements entrench managers too much, leading to both poor financial
and “social” performance.

*

Briefing Attorney, Supreme Court of Texas; B.A. Stanford University; M.A. (Sociology)
Stanford University; J.D. Harvard Law School. I’d like to thank Noah Clements, Einer
Elhauge, Jon Hanson and Robert Steiner for their helpful comments, as well as Micah May
for his contribution to the statistical analysis.

2

Shane M. Shelley

[10-Mar-06
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A growing number of academics have suggested U.S. corporate governance laws bestow
too much power on managers. Much of the research focuses on the relationship between
corporate governance arrangements, which supply a means to managerial power, and the
financial performance of corporations. This exclusive focus on financial performance may
be misguided. Although profits serve as a proxy for the benefits corporations provide
society, they do not always adequately reflect the costs of the activities that generated
them. In this sense, financial performance may not give an accurate, or at least complete,
picture of the real value of corporations. Whether managers are too entrenched by the
laws of corporate governance, therefore, depends not only on their profitability but also on
how they spend their discretion. Importantly, entrenched managers could use their
discretion to sacrifice profits in the public interest. Building on prior research, this Article
compares six entrenching governance provisions with the appearance of corporations on
two investment indexes based on “social responsibility,” a measurement of performance
along environmental, social and alternative economic factors. The results confirm a social
psychological hypothesis of the Article: entrenchment–as measured by the presence of
these six provisions–was negatively, and significantly, related to inclusion in the indexes.
Although I offer competing explanations in addition to the hypothesis, the results
tentatively support the conclusion that certain corporate governance arrangements
entrench managers too much, leading to both poor financial and “social” performance.

INTRODUCTION
Self-interest governs the all-too-human managers of our public
corporations. We should be wary of corporate laws that insulate themfrom
accountability to shareholders and the external markets for corporate
control. Without the discipline of accountability, executives pursue
personal agendas adverse to the interests of the corporation and, in the end,
society as a whole.1 For corporate wealth means social wealth,2 each of
which is harmed by the accumulation of excessive incomes and selfaggrandizing empires, the theft of business opportunities, shirking of
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See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 71, 72, 88-89 (2003); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of
American Corporate Finance, 91 COL. L. REV. 10, 12 (1991). See generally, Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
2
See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Sept. 13, 1970).
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responsibilities and just plain lame performance.3 Such becomes the
aggravated case when managers are left with more discretion than
necessary, entrenched against the discipline of accountability to the interests
of others.
Research, in fact, demonstrates a negative relationship between
corporate governance arrangements that entrench managers and financial
value. Staggered boards of directors, for example, which “stagger” the
election of directors and make their wholesale replacement nearly
impossible, have been associated with decadent financial performance.4 As
have limits on the rights of shareholders to amend corporate charters and
bylaws, “poison pills” that preclude straightforward takeovers and “golden
parachutes” that guarantee a profitable landing for departing executives.5
Each of these arrangements entrench managers and have been statistically
related to lower financial value for the corporations burdened with them.
Use of these provisions, the research argues, should be curtailed.
But an exclusive focus on financial performance could be misguided.
Self-interest comes in many forms. Managers, like people in general,
respond to social and moral norms as well as financial incentives. Further,
even with such an expanded understanding of self-interest, humans continue
to confound the experts. In short, research also demonstrates a great deal of
behavior cannot be explained in terms of the more rational and avaricious
motivations assumed above.6 And we should be thankful. Managers, at
least, have some sense of human decency; corporations–the infamous
sociopaths–do not.7 For this reason, among others, corporate wealth does
not always mean social wealth.8 Thus, some discretion from accountability
3

See David I. Walker, The Manager’s Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 591-598
(2005); Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 72, 88-89.
4
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. OF
FIN. ECON. 409 (2005); Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002).
5
See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, HARV. L.
SCH. OLIN DISC. PAPER 491 (2004). Practitioners note golden parachutes also incentivize
managers to sell their corporations; thus, such provisions certainly allocate power to
managers, but their effects on beneficial takeovers are more uncertain.
6
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 752-754 (2005).
7
JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND
POWER (2004).
8
Corporations, for example, require regulation for the purpose of managing negative
externalities–those costs of corporate activities not reflected in corporate profits. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS, 98 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds.,
1985)(“there is no theoretical doubt about the propriety of legal intervention that requires
firms to take account of the effects of their acts on third parties”).
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to shareholders and takeovers, and therefore some discretion from the cold
maximization of profits, allows managers the freedom to act on social and
moral obligations that could mitigate the otherwise unregulated costs of
some corporate activities.9 In some cases, managers could be spending their
discretion on the sacrifice of profits for the public, rather than private, good.
Financial performance, therefore, does not give us a complete picture of the
social value of entrenchment and, accordingly, the wisdom of legally
allowing the aforementioned governance arrangements.
Each of these perspectives likely bears some resemblance to the truth.
Managers, like most everyone else, respond to selfish impulses, social
norms, moral beliefs and inherent concern for other humans. Although
conventional wisdom asserts selfish impulses run the best race, social
psychological theory does not support such simplicity. Rather, context
plays as much a role as anything in determining not only which motivations
come to the fore, but also how these motivations are played out. For
example, games–a type of context–bring competitive natures to the
foreground. The rules of the games, whether they involve the accumulation
of wealth or the scoring of goals, affect how the competition unfolds.
Importantly, neither the games nor the rules are a priori necessary. For this
reason, whether entrenched managers use their discretion for personal glory
or public interest could depend, at least in part, on the contexts in which
managers find themselves. Corporate governance arrangements are, of
course, part of the context.
Context could produce some surprising results. Apart from a natural
skepticism about the probability that entrenched managers would use their
discretion for the public interest, I was interested in the possibility that
managers accountable to shareholders and takeover markets might be
accountable to broader social concerns because their context accentuates
general accountability as a rule of thumb. Accordingly, I predicted
entrenched managers–who are less accountable to profits–would also lead
less socially responsible corporations. Building on the research negatively
associating financial value with entrenchment, I compared the entrenchment
provisions of those studies with inclusion in two established investment
indexes of socially responsible corporations. As predicted, entrenchment
was also negatively associated with inclusion in these indexes, further
supporting the position that governance provisions, such as staggered
boards, deserve careful scrutiny not only for their detraction from financial
9

See, Elhauge, supra note 6, at 747-749, 751-756 (social and moral norms supplement
government regulation, which is inherently imperfect because of under- and over-inclusion
problems, interest group influences and the imperfect aggregation of preferences); GEORGE
J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 119-120 (1988)(observing interest
groups tend to corrupt government regulation).
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value, but their potential implication for broader measures of social value as
well.
Part I reviews the research suggesting a negative relationship between
entrenching governance arrangements and financial value. Part II presents
the results of my empirical study, suggesting a negative relationship
between these provisions and social responsibility as well. Numerous
explanations could be offered for the results. Part III reviews a sample,
including the social-psychological theory that led to the study. Normative
claims about entrenchment prove difficult. Plausible interpretations, for
example, include the possibility that profitable corporations and managers
merely “game” social responsibility indexes. Much of Part III, however,
paints a rosier picture. Coupled with existing research on financial
performance, the results of this study tentatively buttress claims that present
corporate governance laws allow too much insulation from accountability.
Nevertheless, the Article concludes with a discussion of problems that
inhere in any practical changes to the laws of corporate governance.
Entrenchment may present a dilemmafor financial and social value, but we
should take care that any remedies do not cause more harm than good. In
this way, areas for further research are also discussed.
In the background, this Article has two additional objectives unrelated
to definitive normative conclusions. First, this Article hopes to address,
through example, the significant lack of empirical research within corporate
governance law, and business literature generally, concerning
measurements of value apart from financial performance.10 Second, this
Article explores the use of “critical realism”11 in conjunction with “law and
economics” approaches. Among other things, such realism can inform law
and economic models based on narrow conceptions of the human animal
and its “self-interest.” Each approach influences what follows, but we
should understand that the former, more psychologically oriented,
framework predicted the empirical results herein. In these respects, the
Article hopes to serve as an example of how empirical research surrounding
corporate law could be expanded and enriched through an amalgam of
economics and psychology.

10

See Margolis, Walsh & Weber, Social Issues and Management: Our Lost Cause
Found, 29 J. MGMT. 859, (2003)(after reviewing research published from 1958 to 2001,
concluding scholarship has increasingly focused on financial performance and paid little
attention to other effects on society).
11
Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
129 (2003).
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I. ENTRENCHED MANAGERS CREATE LESS FINANCIAL VALUE
Shareholders of a corporation could respond to management
shortcomings in several ways. Shareholders could publicly speak out;
demand redress of grievances through shareholder proposals;12 sell their
stock and leave;13 or oust the managers and start anew. Complete and
effective response would likely require some combination of these forms.14
However, good old-fashioned oustings of executives appear most favored.15
Delaware, the grand dame of corporate law, has recognized the “shareholder
12

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
See generally Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets:
the Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. LAW. 681
(2002)(observing the rise of this option but discussing its inefficacy).
14
See generally ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). With regard to corporations,
Hirschman focuses on the response of consumers; his general theory applies to
shareholders as well. Hirschman sorts responses into two broad types–“voice” and “exit”–
that roughly refer to voicing opinions and leaving altogether. Each have limitations,
necessitating a complex interplay of both for effective feedback. Shareholders, for
example, may generally like their corporation and its management; responding with an
“exit” to dissatisfaction with a particular aspect of the business, then, would be
inappropriate. Under different circumstances, responding with “voice” to systemic
dissatisfaction could prove futile and a waste of resources. Matters become much more
complicated with the incorporation of timing into considerations of optimal responses.
“Exit” options, for example, may occur too late; by the time a shareholder sells his
ownership or ousts management, the damage may have already occurred beyond repair.
13

15

Even with the rise of institutional investors, shareholders lack the interest, resources,
expertise and incentives to adequately monitor corporate decisions at the level of
shareholder proposals. Furthermore, there are reasons to believe exit strategies of selling
shares and boycotting corporations have serious limitations as well. This leaves ousting as
the most effective and appropriate response to perceived poor performance. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 514-15
(2002) (observing scholarship that notes shareholders lack the interest, resources, expertise
and incentives to monitor the details of corporate management); Edward B. Rock, The
Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J.
445, 453-464 (1991)(observing collective action problems of shareholders); Knoll, supra
note 2, at 683-684, 710-713 (observing theoretical limitations of responding to
dissatisfaction through selling shares). But cf. Rock, supra note 15, at 447, 452 (discussing
rising role of institutional shareholders, opportunity for amelioration of collective action
problems, but new level of agency problems); Knoll, supra note 15 at 685-686 (noting
political efficacy of divestment campaigns in South African corporations during apartheid).
Additionally, SEC regulations constrict shareholder proposals significantly. See 17 C.F.R.
240 § 14a-8(i). Further, such resolutions are precatory and regularly ignored by
management. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 876-877 (2005).
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franchise” as the “ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of
directorial power rests.”16 As the Delaware Supreme Court observed, “If
the stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected
representatives the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to
turn the board out.”17
Laws of corporate governance, on the other hand, provide numerous
means with which the managers of public corporations can protect
themselves from shareholder meddling.18 With regard to that old-fashioned
ousting, executive salvation often comes from limitations on the rights of
shareholders and defenses against outside takeovers adopted by boards of
directors.19 These governance provisions entrench managers in their jobs,
insulating them, to some extent, from accountability to shareholders and
takeover markets.20 For some, these provisions render the promise of the
“shareholder franchise” a “myth.”21 Nevertheless, debate ranges as to the
effects of entrenchment on the financial value of corporations. Although
entrenchment provides the means to pursue harmful personal agendas,22
entrenchment also allows for long-term strategies, cohesive boards of
directors and reduced waste in the defense of takeovers.23
16

Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
18
Apart from corporate governance arrangements, prominent legal doctrines, such as
the “business judgment rule,” protect managers as well. See, e.g., REV. MOD. BUS. CORP.
ACT § 8.31(a)(2); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971).
19
Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 2-3.
20
Id. at 5.
21
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW.
43, 45 (2003).
22
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5 at 5-6 (reviewing literature); Lucian A. Bebchuk,
The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 793 (2002);
Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981)(concern over effects on
takeovers); Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ.
110 (1965)(weakened discipline could lead to shirking, empire-building and extraction of
private benefits by incumbents).
23
See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company's
Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67 (2003)(noting, among other
things, management discretion prevents special interest directors, balkanized boards and
expensive proxy contests); Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the
Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577 (2003)(reduces need to pursue other,
more inefficient anti-takeover strategies that are unregulated); Lynn A. Stout, Do
Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation
Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845 (December 2002)(ex ante analysis suggests anti-takeover
provisions encourage non-shareholder groups to make extra-contractual investments in
corporate team production); Bebchuk, supra note 21, at 43 (citing numerous SEC comment
letters arguing against increased shareholder access to board elections); Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Lars Stole, Do Short-Term Managerial Objectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in
17
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Entrenched managers appear to be using their discretion more for
personal agendas than corporate wealth. Empirical evidence supports the
proposition that greater entrenchment, under the present balance of power
within the corporate form, leads to lower financial performance.24 For
example, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell argue four constitutional
governance provisions and two takeover defenses particularly entrench
managers from shareholder and takeover accountability and, in the end, are
strongly associated with lower financial value.25 In short, there may be six
particularly potent governance provisions executives can use to protect their
jobs. Staggered boards, limits to shareholder amendments of the corporate
bylaws, super-majority voting requirements for mergers and other
acquisition transactions, and super-majority voting requirements for charter
amendments compose the constitutional provisions; poison pills and golden
parachutes compose the takeover defenses.26
Statistical data demonstrated a significant, negative relationship
between the level of entrenchment–as measured by the aggregated presence
of these six provisions–and the financial value of corporations–as measured
by Tobin’s Q, an increasingly standard economic indicator.27 Bebchuk et
al. also observed a significant, negative relationship between financial
performance and each provision separately.28 Underlying these results lurks
the hypothesis that self-interested managers–agents of the shareholders of
the corporation–shockingly divert corporate resources from the pockets of
investors to other ends. With more entrenchment comes more diversion.29
Theory supports these results. Each of these provisions was expected to
produce significant insulation from accountability to shareholders and
external takeovers.30 With such increased entrenchment, incentives to
maximize profits relax, the interests of managers diverge from shareholders
Long-Term Projects? 48 J. FIN. 719-729 (1993)(allows for long-term investment); Jeremy
Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61-80 (1988)(allows
for long-term investment); Rene Stulz, Managerial Control of Voting Rights, J. Fin. Econ.,
20, 25-54 (1988)(allows incumbents to extract higher control premium for shareholders).
24
See Bebchuk, supra note 15 at 852-853, 898-901 (2005); Bebchuk et al., supra note
5, at 11-12; Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 4.
25
Bebchuk et al., supra note 5.
26
Id. at 6-9.
27
Id. at 16. They use the following measurement of “Q”: market value of assets
divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as the
book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the sum of book value of
common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes. Id. at 17. They also present empirical
data demonstrating a negative correlation between entrenchment and abnormal shareholder
returns throughout the 1990s. Id. at 22-33.
28
Id. at 20.
29
Id. at 18-19.
30
Id. at 6-7.
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and the corporation suffers.31 Empirically, the data suggests these costs
outweigh any theoretical benefits from increased managerial insulation. A
brief description of the provisions and their entrenching nature follows.
Having a staggered board means the directors of the board are divided
into classes with only one class of directors coming up for reelection each
year.32 Consequently, shareholders cannot replace a majority of the
directors in any given year regardless of support for such change.33
Staggered boards are a powerful defense against removal in either a proxy
fight or proxy contests.34 Independent empirical evidence has observed
negative relationships between the presence of staggered boards and
susceptibility to takeover35 as well as firm value.36
Boards may limit the ability of shareholders to amend the bylaws as
well.37 These limits, contained either in corporate charters or the bylaws
themselves, usually take the form of super-majority voting requirements.38
In addition, corporations may limit the ability of shareholders to amend the
charter and limit their ability to approve mergers and other acquisition
transactions.39 Again, such limitations usually take the form of supermajority voting requirements.40 Given the nature of shareholder ownership
in large public corporations, such super-majority requirements greatly
impede not only the ability of shareholders to affect change but also the
success of even shareholder favored takeovers.41
31

Bebchuk, supra note 21, at 44 (shareholder power provides directors incentives to
serve shareholder interests); Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 72 (managers can use
discretion for empire building, retaining excess corporate cash and entrench themselves
despite poor performance); id. at 88-89 (rent extraction, besides increasing executive pay,
dilutes and distorts management incentives and harms corporate performance); FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 262
(1991)(presuming managers with power will “wring” as much from shareholders as
possible); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L. J. 698, 701 (1982)(financial incentives ameliorate agency costs due to diverging
interests of managers and shareholders).
32
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(d).
33
Bebchuk et al. supra note 5 at 6-7.
34
Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 4.
35
Id.
36
Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 4.
37
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 109.
38
Such limits can make shareholder amendments to the bylaws virtually impossible.
See Bebchuk et al. supra note 5 at 7 n. 2 (citing Chesapeake Corp. v Marc P. Shore).
39
See, e.g. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102.
40
Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 7.
41
See Roe, supra note 1, at 26 (observing political origins of American corporate
structure, which have constrained ability of institutional ownership, resulting in dispersed
ownership and greater management discretion and control). See also Elhauge, supra note
6, at 816; Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
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Poison pills, a takeover defense, preclude straight-forward hostile
takeovers that would have simply accumulated stock for the purpose of
attaining ownership control.42 Such “pills”, which “poison” the stock,
usually render further acquisition of shares prohibitively expensive after a
threshold of ownership.43 Golden parachutes, another defense, provide
departing executives cushy severance packages and thereby increase the
cost of takeovers accompanied by the replacement of management.44 Of
course, a corporate board can create these two provisions at any time; thus,
even corporations that do not have these provisions could be seen as having
their shadowy versions.45 At the same time, not all corporations do have
them in place and shareholders have demonstrated an increasing distrust of
their presence; in the end, then, the presence of these provisions may not
reflect entrenchment itself but the attitude of corporate managers toward the
practice.46
Although other corporate governance arrangements could contribute to
entrenchment as well, there are theoretical reasons to doubt the significance
of such contributions.47 More importantly, however, Bebchuk et al.
empirically reach the same conclusion. Their study evaluated a group of
“other provisions” as well; these “other provisions” did not result in
statistically significant relationships.48 Such results support the hypothesis
that staggered boards, limits to shareholder amendments of the bylaws,
super-majority requirements for mergers and other acquisition transactions,
super-majority requirements for charter amendments, poison pills and
golden parachutes drive most of the negative relationship with financial
value, and, by implication, contribute most significantly to the
entrenchment of corporate managers.49
530–31, 542–53, 562–64, 567– 68 (1990).
42
Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 8.
43
See Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L. 381,
382-383 (2002)(describing “flip-over”, “flip-in” and “back-end” pills, all of which, in the
end, dilute the interests of an acquirer, rendering the takeover prohibitively expensive).
44
Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 8. It should be noted that practitioners with whom I
spoke expressed ambivalence about golden parachutes because such parachutes could,
under the right circumstances, actually incentivize managers to sell the corporation and
make a quick profit. Broadly speaking, golden parachutes are perhaps best characterized as
provisions that allocate control to managers but do not necessarily reduce the likelihood of
beneficial takeovers.
45
Id. at 8-9.
46
Id. See also supra, note 44, discussing an additional caveat regarding golden
parachutes.
47
Id. at 10-11.
48
Id. at 17-22.
49
Id. at 33. Bebchuk et al. go on to qualify that some of the relationship between
entrenchment provisions and financial value could merely reflect the decision to entrench
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II. ENTRENCHED MANAGERS CREATE LESS SOCIAL VALUE
Undoubtedly manager entrenchment has a variety of effects for different
executives and corporations. Entrenchment provides managers discretion to
pursue long-term profits in the face of short-term demands from selfinterested shareholders;50 but also pursue personal agendas at the expense of
shareholder profits;51 or, perhaps, sacrifice profits for the good of the
public.52 As should be emphasized, which of these outcomes usually
accompanies entrenchment deserves empirical treatment; theoretical and
anecdotal evidence support each.53
As Part I discussed, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell have
observed, in the aggregate, a negative relationship between financial value
and six governance provisions most associated with entrenchment.
Although a statistical relationship does not necessarily mean entrenchment
itself produces lower financial value, these results do suggest entrenched
managers may use their discretion for ends independent of corporate and
shareholder wealth.
That entrenched managers sacrifice financial value does not, however,
indict entrenchment as a problem for social value. As noted above,
entrenched managers may be sacrificing corporate profits for their own
profits, for the sake of extra time on the golf course or for the sake of the
public. This last possibility, explored by Professor Elhauge in Sacrificing
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest,54 presents an interesting, but
overlooked,55 challenge to those calling for changes to corporate
by managers of already poorly performing corporations. Such an issue of causality,
however, does not change the overarching claim that these provisions enable entrenchment.
Id.
50
Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 23;Stout, supra note 23; Bebchuk & Stole, supra
note 23; Stein, supra note 23.
51
See Graef Crystal, New CEO Pay-Outsourcing Study is Out of Bounds, September 1,
2004 (though disagreeing with study, agreeing that CEO pay “borders on the
obscene”)(Bloomberg); GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991); Bebchuk & Fried,
supra note 1 (understanding present levels of executive compensation as an agency
problem); John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholder Versus Managers: the Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1986)(noting preferences for greater compensation, greater
psychic income, and greater security revealed in empire-building). Managers might also
entrench themselves simply because they have inherited a corporation performing poorly
independent of their own efforts.
52
Elhauge, supra note 6.
53
See supra notes 50-52. Empirical evidence has already discounted the possibility
that entrenched managers predominately use their discretion to pursue long-term profits.
See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 5.
54
Elhauge, supra note 6.
55
See id. at 736-737.
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governance laws in the form of increased accountability to shareholders and
takeover markets. Granted entrenched managers probably employ their
discretion to the service of self-interest.
Self-interest, however,
encompasses social and moral preferences, which, in the end, could lead
managers to make socially valuable profit-sacrificing decisions.56
This possibility also reveals a conspicuous incompleteness in the
academic assessment of the underlying value to society of corporate
governance arrangements. As Professor Elhauge observes, the “canonical”
obsession with profit- maximization
helps define the boundaries of the corporate law field. It leaves corporate law
scholars free to ignore issues about any effects the corporation may have on
the external world as topics best addressed by other legal fields, and to focus
on more tractable models about which corporate rules would maximize
shareholder value.57

This makes some sense. Corporations are, after all, the infamous, amoral
sociopaths, obedient only to the pursuit of profits.58 Only the managers at
the helm bring the social norms of a human being to the wheel. Loosening
the market shackles of these executives allows breathing room for the
sacrifice of profits when their social and moral norms dictate.59
No doubt, on occasion, this occurs. But what happens more often? Do
executives use their discretion for the money trough or the public alms?
Economic theory and evidence focused on the association of entrenchment
with financial value do not speak to an association with social value apart
from equating financial wealth with social wealth. Ironically, however,
social psychological theory, which usually departs from such analysis, also
could support the assessment of entrenchment as a problem. As discussed
in the Introduction, and discussed in greater detail in Part III, managers, like
everyday people, respond to financial and non-financial incentives. Which
incentives come to the foreground, and how these incentives unfold,
depends in part on context. Because entrenchment against financial
accountability creates a context of irresponsibility generally, I predicted
entrenched managers would be less accountable to social concerns as well.
This Article undertakes an empirical assessment of the debate. Building
on the work of Bebchuk et al., the remainder of Part II compares levels of
entrenchment, as measured by the presence of their six entrenching
provisions, with the appearance of corporations on two indexes used for
socially responsible investing. As the results demonstrate, entrenchment
was negatively associated with the appearance of corporations on these
indexes, buttressing the conclusion that entrenchment not only harms
56

Id. at 796-818.
Id.
58
See generally BAKAN, supra note 7.
59
Elhauge, supra note 6, at 740.
57
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financial value, but, more broadly, social value as well.
A. Sources of Data
Our social responsibility indexes are mouthfuls: the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index World (DJSIW)60 and the Financial Times Stock
Exchange For Good U.S. Index Top 100 (FTSE4GoodUS100).61
Governance data came from the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC).62 Financial and ownership data came from ExecuComp and
Compustat.63
1. Social Responsibility Data
DJSIW and FTSE4GoodUS100 were used for several reasons. First,
each of these indexes aggregate data into coherent “scores” based on a wide
range of social responsibility criteria.64 Second, each generally takes bestof-class approaches, assessing corporations by industry specific, as well as
general, criteria.65 Third, Dow Jones and the Financial Times, providers of
these indexes, are established investment institutions with considerable
resources enabling thorough research and procedural safeguards like
independent auditing;66 accordingly, their social responsibility indexes lead
the pack.67 Fourth, DJSIW and FTS4GoodUS100 are based on research
provided by peer-reviewed members of the social responsibility research
industry, Sustainable Asset Management Research (SAM) and Ethical
Investment Research Service (EIRIS), respectively.68
60

See Dow Jones Sustainability World Indexes Guide (September 2004)(on file with
the author) [herinafter DJSWI Guide]. The most recent version can be found at
http://www.sustainability-index.com.
61
See FTSE4Good Index Series Inclusion Criteria (November 2003)(on file with the
author) [hereinafter FTSE4Good Criteria]. The most recent version can be found at
http://www.ftse.com. FTSE4Good was created in collaboration with UNICEF and the
United Nations Children’s Fund.
62
Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 13. See also www.irrc.org.
63
Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 13; Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Dhananjay Nanda,
Access, Common Agency, and Board Size at 4-5 (October 2004)(unpublished, on file with
author).
64
DJSWI Guide supra note 60 at 9-13; FTSE4Good Criteria supra note 61 at 4-9.
65
See DJSWI Guide supra note 60 at 9-10; FTSE4Good Criteria supra note 61 at 3.
66
See generally www.dj.com; www.ftse.com.
67
See John Buckley & David Monsma, Non-financial Corporate Performance: The
Material Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151,
190 (2004); Benjamin J. Richardson, Enlisting Institutional Investors in Environmental
Regulation: Some Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 247, 289 (2002).
68
See generally www.sam-group.com; www.eiris.org. See also Mistra, SustAinability
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DJSIW tracks the top ten percent, in terms of a “Corporate
Sustainability Assessment,” of corporations followed by the Dow Jones
World Index.69 Data comes from volunteer reporting questionnaires, public
company documents, external media, contact with stakeholders and direct
contact with the corporations.70 Assessment criteria are arranged in
economic, environmental and social categories.71 DJSIW continually
monitors corporations along such criteria;72 PricewaterhouseCoopers audits
the data as well.73
FTSE4GoodUS100 tracks the largest one hundred corporations that
have satisfied social responsibility “Inclusion Criteria”;74 the original source
of corporations comes from the FTSE All-World Developed USA Index,
which tracks the largest U.S. corporations in the world.75 Data comes from
company questionnaires, direct company contact, company reports and
independent research.76 Corporations must meet standards for a given
number of criteria, also generally along economic, environmental and social
categories.77 FTSE4GoodUS100 also independently tracks human rights
records.78 FTSE4GoodUS100 regularly monitors its corporations but does
not appear to employ external auditors.79
Observations for DJSWI and FTSE4GoodUS100 consisted of the years
2004, 2003, 2002 and 2001. Only U.S. corporations in the DJSWI were
studied, meaning about 60 companies each year; FTSE4GoodUS100, of
course, included 100 U.S. companies.
For each index-year, dummy
variables were assigned to corporations based on their presence, or lack
thereof, on the relevant index.
2. Corporate Governance Data

and onValues, Values for Money, Reviewing the Quality of SRI Research,
(2004)(evaluating SAM as the best all-around social responsibility investment research
organization, with EIRIS rated favorably), available at www.mistra.org.
69
The Dow Jones World Index covers over 5000 of the largest publicly traded
corporations in the world. See http://www.djindexes.com.
70
DJSWI Guide, supra note 60, at 9.
71
Id. at 9-13. DJSWI covers subjects such as codes of conduct, corporate governance,
customer relationships; environmental performance, efficiency and reporting; and labor
practices, human capital development and standards for suppliers.
72
Id. at 16-18.
73
Id. at 9.
74
FTSE4Good Inclusion, supra note 61, at 4.
75
See www.ftse.com.
76
FTSE4Good Inclusion, supra note 61, at 4.
77
Id. at 4-9. FTSE4Good covers subjects comparable to DJSIW.
78
Id. at 7-9.
79
Id. at 4.
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Data regarding entrenchment was taken from the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). At the time of this study, the
IRRC had published data in six volumes: September, 1990; July, 1993;
July, 1995; February, 1998; November, 1999; and February, 2002.80 Each
volume follows roughly 1400 to 1800 corporations, which always have
included the S&P 500.81 Each year accounts for over ninety percent of U.S.
market capitalization.82 The IRRC tracks a great deal of corporate
governance variables, including whether the corporations have the
entrenchment provisions studied by Bebchuk et al. Each corporation was
given an entrenchment score based, with equal weight, on the number of
entrenchment provisions the corporation contained.
3. Control Data
Compustat, ExecuComp and IRRC provided control data. Control
variables included the size of the corporation (in terms of total assets),83 the
level of insider ownership, the level of institutional ownership and the
number of directors. Corporate size was expected to bear a strong
relationship to presence on the indexes because these indexes only included
large public corporations.
Both inside ownership and institutional
ownership could bear some relation to entrenchment in that levels of
ownership reflect, to some extent, levels of control. The number of
directors in a corporation has been related to the number of stakeholder
interests with which the corporation concerns itself;84 because each index
tracks a range of social responsibility concerns, the number of directors
could also bear some relation to its appearance on these indexes.
4. Methodology
For each year of each social responsibility index, dummy variables for
inclusion on the index served as the dependent variables. This variable was
regressed against the entrenchment scores, as well as the size of the
corporation (in terms of total assets), the level of insider ownership, the
number of directors and the level of institutional ownership. Because IRRC
data was not available for every year studied, data for the remaining years
were “filled”;85 the method of filling–either using a previous year or later
80

See also Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 13.
Id.
82
Id.
83
See also id. at 17.
84
Aggarwal & Nanda, supra note 63.
85
Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 13.
81
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year of IRRC data–made no substantive difference in the results.86
Corporations with dual classes of stock, as well as Real Estate Investment
Trusts, were removed from the study because of their anomalous
capitalization and corporate control structures.87 Corporations with insider
ownership greater than fifty percent were also excluded because such inside
executives were de facto “entrenched” independent of any corporate
governance arrangements.
B. Results
Bebchuk et al. provide thorough analysis of the incidence of corporate
governance provisions, their rates of increase or decline over the years and
general levels of entrenchment.88 About half of the corporations studied
had entrenchment scores of three or more, with the incidence of these levels
slightly increasing over time,89 suggesting entrenchment on account of these
governance provisions represents a significant concern. Here we focus on
the relationship between the entrenchment provisions and appearance on the
two indexes of social responsibility. Tables I and II report the results from
each social responsibility index. Each table reports the coefficients of all
independent variables; statistical significance is reported in parentheses.
TABLE I: DJSIW
2004
2003

86

2001

ENTRENCHMENT

-.00966
(.018)

-.00858
(.044)

-.0091
(.016)

-.01024
(.025)

TOTAL ASSETS

4.97E-07
(.000)

4.15E-07
(.000)

2.61e-07
(.001)

3.55e-07
(.001)

NUMBER OF DIRECTORS

.00406
(.005)

.00517
(.003)

.0046
(.004)

.00525
(.010)

INSIDE OWNERSHIP

-.00853
(.004)

-.00907
(.003)

-.00589
(.008)

-.001
(.006)

INSTIT. OWNERSHIP

-3.79E-09
(.734)

-3.93E-09
(.736)

-3.60E-07
(.738)

-4.33e-09
(.726)

ADJ. R2

.057

.0434

.025

.0289

See also id.
See id. at 13-14.
88
Id. at 14-16.
89
Id. at 15.
87

2002

10-Mar-06]

Entrenched Managers

17

TABLE II: FTSE4GOODUS100
2004
2003
2002

2001

ENTRENCHMENT

-.01666
(0.001)

-.01489
(0.003)

-.01451
(.003)

-.00808
(.131)

TOTAL ASSETS

8.21E-07
(.000)

8.48E-07
(.000)

8.43e-07
(.000)

7.67e-07
(.000)

NUMBER OF DIRECTORS

.01587
(.000)

.01921
(.000)

.01897
(.000)

.01513
(.000)

INSIDE OWNERSHIP

-.00072
(.048)

-.00092
(.011)

-.00071
(.011)

-.00107
(.011)

INSTIT. OWNERSHIP

-6.57E-09
(.635)

-6.62E-09
(.630)

-6.46e-09
(.637)

-5.31e-09
(.714)

ADJ. R2

.1335

.1617

.1483

.0953

As the tables reflect, the results were rather consistent:
(i) Entrenchment. Every observation but one indicates a negative,
statistically significant relationship between the level of entrenchment and
appearance on these social responsibility indexes. Possible interpretations
of these results are discussed below in Part III.
(ii) Corporate Size. Every observation indicates a positive,
statistically significant relationship between the size of the corporation, in
terms of assets, and inclusion in the indexes, owing most likely to the fact
that the indexes consisted of the largest corporations in the U.S.
(iii) Number of Directors. Every observation indicates a positive,
statistically significant relationship between the number of directors on the
board and inclusion in the indexes. To the extent these indexes cover a
range of social responsibility concerns, these results accord with other
empirical work that has related the number of directors to the number of
social interests with which a corporation engages.90
(iv) Insider Ownership. Every observation indicates a negative,
statistically significant relationship between levels of insider ownership and
inclusion in the indexes. Because ownership, to some extent, reflects
control, inside ownership reflects, to some extent, entrenchment. In this
sense, under most interpretations, an observed negative relationship
between inside ownership and these indexes could comport with a negative
relationship between entrenchment provisions and these indexes.
90

Aggarwal & Nanda, supra note 63.

18

Shane M. Shelley

[10-Mar-06

(v) Institutional Ownership. Insignificant, negative relationships
were observed between institutional ownership and inclusion in the indexes.
Greater institutional ownership could be expected to reduce levels of
entrenchment.91 Levels of institutional ownership, however, could have a
range of effects on social responsibility inclusion, depending on the
interests of the institutions, the relationship of social responsibility to
financial value and the effects such institutional ownership has on
management incentives and perceptions.
There exists the concern that the consistency of these results merely
reflected consistency among the indexes and among the years of each index.
Table III displays the percentage of corporations in the DJSIW that were
also in the FTSE4GoodUS100 each year; Table IV displays the number of
changes made to each index year-over-year.
TABLE III: NUMBER OF DJSIW COMPANIES IN FTSE4GOODUS100
2004
2003
2002
2001
22/64
34%

20/64
31%

16/57
28%

18/68
26%

TABLE IV: NUMBER OF CHANGES YEAR-OVER-YEAR
2004-2003
2003-2002
2002-2001
DJSIW

FTSE4GOODUS100

17

30

44

27%

53%

65%

41
41%

0
0%

38
38%

As Tables C and D reflect, there were a great number of differences
between the indexes themselves and within the indexes year over year.
There was only one exception to the variation: FTSE4GoodUS100 made no
changes in its index from 2002 to 2003. Thus, for the most part,
consistency among the indexes and the years of each index does not explain
the consistency of the regression results.92 Indeed, the significant variation
91

But see Roe, supra note 1.
Such differences could reflect a number of things. Differences between the indexes
could reflect: differences in methodology; differences in assessments of what constitutes
socially responsible behavior; or the fact that U.S. corporations in the DJSIW are pooled
against corporations internationally, whereas U.S. corporations in the FTSE4Good100 only
compete among themselves. Differences year over year within each index ideally reflect
accurate monitoring of the corporations involved, with changes made accordingly.
92
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among the indexes and the years supports the robustness of the data. As
evidenced below, however, normative interpretation of these results proves
difficult.
III. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE RESULTS
What follows offers a sample of interpretative frameworks. This does
not constitute an exclusive list, nor a complete analysis from the
frameworks herein. Rather, Part III provides an introduction to some of the
issues raised by the results and the relationship between entrenchment–
which, to some extent, boils down to insulation from accountability to
profits–and inclusion in indexes of social responsibility. Each of the
frameworks offers a glimpse into what the empirical data could reveal about
entrenching corporate governance provisions. Although we are far from
definitive normative conclusions, the gist of the analysis supports the
argument that entrenching governance arrangements should be carefully
scrutinized.
A. Doing Well By Doing Good
Without the protection of entrenchment, managers find themselves more
accountable to shareholders and the market for takeovers. Because
shareholders are most concerned with profits,93 and takeovers discipline
underperforming profitability,94 these executives must be profitable to keep
their jobs and increase their pay. That the corporations run by these
managers also appear on social responsibility indexes therefore reflects the
distinct possibility that a great deal of socially responsible behavior
increases profits. Indeed, Dow Jones launched its responsibility indexes on
the premise that “corporate sustainability” “create[s] long-term shareholder
value by embracing opportunities and managing risks deriving from
economic, environmental and social developments.”95
Dow Jones
understands “sustainability as a catalyst for enlightened and disciplined
management, and, thus, a crucial success factor.”96
Perhaps we should be relieved to find that rigorous profit-maximization
means rigorous social responsibility. Sound labor practices make more
productive workers; “green” energy can be cost-effective. Undoubtedly this
occurs. Ford Motor Company, for example, renovated its River Rouge
93

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 31, at 718 (assuming shareholders prefer profitmaximization).
94
Id. at 701.
95
DJSWI Guide, supra note 60, at 8.
96
Id.
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manufacturing plant with a roof of living sedum plants, drainage swales,
permeable pavement, skylights and restored natural habitats not only for the
sake of the environment.97 Rather, the sedum roof should out-last
traditional tar-and-metal and provide better insulation, saving costs; the
roof, swales and permeable pavement filter run-off and reduce liability for
river pollution; and employees are healthier, happier and more productive.98
For the moment, assume these results present a best-of-all- possible
worlds. Profitable managers are also socially responsible because such
responsibility maximizes profits. Because our indexes provide a rough, but
accurate, indication of such responsibility, and because such responsibility
maximizes profits, appearance on these indexes does not indicate overresponses to social interests but an alignment of such interests with
corporate wealth. Several concerns require elaboration with this in mind.
First, the explanation that managers “do well by doing good” does not,
in itself, provide a normative claim against entrenchment because the
explanation makes no claims as to causality.99 Ex post we can describe the
state of the world; ex ante we have not predicted how entrenchment has
affected that state. In other words, accountable, as opposed to entrenched,
managers could be socially responsible because the incentives of
accountability to profits push them in that direction. On the other hand,
profitable and socially responsible managers could be accountable because
their performance has never necessitated the protection of entrenchment. In
one form or another, this problem plagues any interpretation of the results.
We do have reasons, however, to discount the issue. Entrenchment
resulting from more permanent constitutional provisions, such as staggered
boards and super-majority voting requirements, arguably supports a causal
explanation because underperforming managers would find after-the-fact
institution of these arrangements difficult.100
Second, assuming causality was not a significant problem, explaining
the negative relationship between entrenchment and social responsibility in
this manner requires the further assumption that the incentives to financially
perform lead managers to perform in a socially responsible way as well.
Some would have no qualms with this assumption because they see
opportunities to make socially responsible profits as “twenty dollar bills
lying on the sidewalk”; managers already have “ample incentives to
97

See
www.ford.com/en/goodWorks/environment/cleanerManufacturing/rougeRenovation.htm
98
See MICHAEL BRAUNGART & WILLIAM MCDONOUGH, CRADLE TO CRADLE 160-164
(2002). See also Andrew Wagner, Corporate Consciousness, Dwell Magazine 170-172
(October/November 2004).
99
See also Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 33.
100
Id. at 33-34. This does not, however, hold true with regard to poison pills and
golden parachutes.
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recognize and act on such profit-maximizing opportunities.”101 Such a
perspective, however, may underestimate important characteristics of the
business world. Managers face incredible complexity in the production of
their goods and services. Accordingly, the production of comparable goods
and services could, and probably does, occur through different but
comparably profitable paths.102
Concluding which of these paths
maximizes social responsibility, in addition to the uncertain task of
maximizing profits,103 requires surmounting significant practical and
cognitive hurdles, especially when the paths of social responsibility involve
departure from the paths of custom and preconceived categories of
possibility.104
For this reason, the assumption that managers would readily find those
twenty dollar bills appears somewhat unrealistic. At the very least, we
might conclude some corporations find the bills faster; our indexes might
track those in the vanguard. Because no affirmative justification exists for
assuming a union between the incentives to make profits and the incentives
to act responsibly, we are left, at this point, with indeterminacy.
Third, and last, this explanation also does not account for the at least
ostensible reasons executives would give for pursuing social responsibility
with their corporations. Ben Cohen, chief executive of Ben & Jerry’s,
asserts, “It makes no sense to compartmentalize our lives — to be cutthroat
in business, and then volunteer some time or donate some money to
charity.”105 Although Ben & Jerry’s was originally a maverick in this
regard, integration of social responsibility principles into corporate
decision-making has become a blueprint of sustainability reports for public
companies.106 Perhaps these corporate leaders are liars or delusional. At
the same time, recall that managers are people and, unlike the corporations
they run, are subject to very human concerns, such as social and moral
norms.
This leaves us with the somewhat paradoxical possibility that managers
accountable to shareholders and takeover markets could be accountable to
101

Elhauge, supra note 6, at 744-745.
See generally SUZANNE BERGER, HOW WE COMPETE (2005)(concluding paths to
financial success are extremely diverse and complex after following over 500 case studies
of international corporations).
103
See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of
Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 91-99 (2004)(describing clarity
of profit-maximization as an illusion).
104
Id. at 99; Jon Hanson & Ronald Chen, Categorically Biased: The Influence of
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1160-1164,
1180, 1186.
105
Chen & Jon Hanson, supra note 103, at 94.
106
Id. at 93-94.
102
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social responsibility for reasons other than accountability to profits and yet
nevertheless related to a lack of entrenchment. In reality, we can relax this
tension with the observation that our investment indexes could be
concerned with particularly conspicuous examples of socially responsible,
profitable practices.107
The tension further relaxes if we assume
shareholders are sometimes concerned with social interests apart from
profits, an increasingly realistic claim.108 Managers accountable to such
shareholders would particularly do well by doing good. In the end,
however, the ambiguous nature of profit-maximization–which renders far
from inevitable the aligning of corporate behavior with profitable, socially
responsible practices–indicates more than this framework could be at
work.109
B. Doing Well By Looking Good
A more skeptical take would suggest managers, pressed for profits,
recognize the publicity value in performing well in indexes of social
responsibility. Just as executives may “game” earnings for the sake of stock
prices, executives concerned with the bottom-line could be “gaming” social
responsibility performance as well.110 Whether the indexes themselves have
been captured by the corporations111 or simply lack the resources to police
them, such gaming goes unpunished. Undoubtedly this occurs as well.
McDonalds may introduce salads to its menu, but the fries keep them in
business. That social disclosure largely occurs on a voluntary basis in an
unregulated context aggravates the problem.112
Of course, there will always be opportunists ready to game the system,
even in a legally regulated world. Increased attention to the subject, as well
as self-regulation,113 has probably helped. Mandatory disclosure laws could
107

DJSIW not only espouses its relationship to success; the index outperformed its
cousin, the Dow Jones Global Index, by 140% over an 8-year period. See Michele Sutton,
Between a Rock and a Judicial Hard Place: Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting and
Potential Legal Liability under Kasky v. Nike, 72 UMKC L. REV. 1159, 1163 (2004).
108
See Social Investment Forum, 2003 Report on Socially Responsible Investing
Trends in the United States (December 2003)(socially responsible investing accounted for
11.3 percent of total investment assets managed by professionals in U.S.).
109
Indeed, Dow Jones launched its sustainability indexes for the very reason that
socially responsible profit-making does not come naturally and requires sustained research.
See DJSIW Guide, supra note 60, at 5, 8.
110
See, e.g., The Economist, The Good Company (January 20, 2005).
111
See STIGLER, supra note 9, at 119-120.
112
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1299-1306 (1999)(proposing possible
models for regulated social responsibility disclosure).
113
Angela J. Campbell, Self-regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 715-
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further the cause.114 Probably some corporations in the indexes studied here
do not belong there. But there are two reasons to discount the prevalence of
gaming. First, enough independent eyes watch the largest corporations to
ensure some degree of honesty in their communications to the public.115
Second, these eyes presently have the support of at least some U.S. laws,
particularly laws prohibiting fraud and, perhaps, even negligent
disclosure.116 Although an inherent problem, “gaming,” or more
euphemistically, “elevat[ing] form over substance,”117 does not wholly
undermine the legitimacy of social responsibility disclosure.
C. Doing Well by Being Good
That corporations with accountable executives find themselves in social
responsibility indexes could reflect the fact that these corporations simply
have good, responsible managers. Such managers could self-select
themselves into situations of accountability (either through seeking
corporations that already have such accountability in place or through
creating such accountability on arrival) or are themselves selected because
of their responsible dispositions. This explanation adequately describes the
statistical observations, but suggests the social performance of corporations
and their managers depends on the social preferences and dispositions of
these executives, which are given. This perspective leaves no debate over
the value of corporate governance arrangements because the arrangements
merely reflect, rather than create, the underlying reality. “Good” managers
lead “good” corporations, such that we can only hope our mothers,
kindergartens, colleges and business schools produce and send them to the
boardroom. Although an inherently difficult explanation to prove, as well
as refute, such a dispositional perspective runs counter to the more
contextual, social psychological interpretation that follows.
D. Doing as We’re Told
Here we elaborate the underlying theory that led to the empirical
hypothesis of the Article. Such a social-psychological interpretation could
muster a rather different explanation for the results. Every executive, at
717 (1999)(generally discussing the possibility and advantages of self-regulation).
114
See Sutton, supra note 107, at 1181-1183; Williams, supra note 112.
115
Sutton supra, note 107; James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of
First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091
(2004).
116
Sutton, supra note 107, at 1176-1177, 1183.
117
Id. at 1183. The euphemism also implies a less malicious explanation: simple
following- the-leader leads to a perfunctory interest in social responsibility indexes.
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least to some extent, experiences the same concerns as every other person:
self-preservation and greater compensation, social status and power,
conformity and obedience, moral obligations and compassion. Self-interest
abides in each of these light and dark corners of the heart, leaving us to
ponder which interests surface, when and how. As psychological research
demonstrates, context plays an important role in bringing out the best and
worst of us. Contrary to a “fundamental attribution error,” which
disproportionately understands behavior as the product of stable
dispositions,118 human behavior reflects a nuanced interaction between
complex personalities and the contextual situations in which they find
themselves. Importantly, such could be the case for managers in the context
of certain corporate governance arrangements.
Herbet Blumer summarized the logic of this approach in his principles
of symbolic interaction:
Humans act toward a thing on the basis of the meaning they assign to the
thing…Meanings are socially derived, which is to say that meaning is not
inherent in a state of nature…There is no absolute meaning. Meaning is
negotiated through interaction with others…The perception and interpretation
of social symbols are modified by the individual's own thought processes.119

Such logic follows inexorably from a very human dilemma. Humans enter
the world with a “bundle of passions.”120 Beyond the most basic
interactions with the world, such as the search for food, these passions
“cannot assess and direct [their] own behavior”121 because meaning does
not inhere in the state of nature. Social interaction provides the meaning
and rules for the game. Accordingly, we must exist in a constant state of
interaction with social contexts, which influence how, and when, our
“passions” unfold. Indeed, even an anti-authoritarian needs the rules of
authority.
Long before Blumer, Shakespeare understood this dilemma more
colorfully. As MacBeth laments,
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.122

Not surprisingly, dramaturgical images abound in the literature of symbolic
interaction and social psychology generally.123 Cognitive theory describes
118

Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 11, at 136-137.
HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM 2 (Prentice-Hall 1969).
120
JODI O'BRIEN & PETER KOLLOCK, THE PRODUCTION OF REALITY 34 (1997).
121
Id.
122
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act V, sc. 5.
123
See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(1959) (introducing the concept of social interaction as a dramaturgical performance).
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context in terms of “schemas,” such as “scripts,” which construct, among
other things, heuristic “roles” that provide meaning to the world. These
schemas are knowledge structures that “influence all aspects of information
processing,” can be “useful under some circumstances” but also a
“liability[y] under others.”124 Research has repeatedly confirmed Blumer’s
fundamentals concerning human nature.125 Social meaning, through
interpretation of the world, mediates the interaction of the “passions” with
context and accordingly provides rules for behavior.
Laws, of course, act as explicit contexts and schemas. Corporate
governance laws and rules are no different. These laws, often viewed in
terms of sanctions and incentives, also provide a meaningful backdrop
through which we understand the appropriate norms of behavior for roles
within the corporate entity. Fiduciary duties, as a relevant example, apart
from creating a framework of legal incentives also generate substance and
meaning for interpretations of how boards of directors should behave. It
seems likely that, regardless of the actual threat of sanctions, directors are
influenced, to some extent, by their awareness of their roles as fiduciaries.
In a similar vein, directors derive their “legitimacy” from the “shareholder
franchise.”126 Such rhetoric further reflects a prominent cultural script in
which directors, and by implication, managers, serve in the roles of
fiduciaries for others.
It should come as no great surprise that governance provisions that
undermine legitimacy undermine more than accountability to shareholders.
Entrenched managers have broken from their legitimate social roles. We
should not expect such managers, under such corrupted circumstances, to
feel any great pressure to account to anyone but themselves. Indeed,
entrenched managers not only experience less accountability to shareholders
and takeover markets but also less reputational accountability to labor
markets.127 It is not necessarily the case that such managers are any more
rotten than the rest of the bunch. Rather, entrenched managers find
themselves in an insulated role that suggests as appropriate, or at least not
unconscionable, the diversion of corporate resources for their more selfish
124
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ends.
Academics themselves contribute to the same context. Scholars have
held forth as appropriate compensation such illicit activities as insider
trading and misappropriating corporate opportunities.128 While debate over
the effects of such activities on corporate wealth continues,129 consideration
of the broader social implications such context has on the role of managers
gets swept under the rug.130 Insider trading and misappropriation simply
sound “unfair” to your average person, particularly when corporate law
prohibits the practices. Regardless of the internal efficiency of such
“compensation,” the practices place managers in a less transparently
accountable role vis-à-vis society.131 It is no wonder entrenched managers
might feel less remorse in their focus on personal, as opposed to public,
gain. They have been told to.132
This interpretation has two important advantages. First, it requires no
assumptions about the equation of profits with social responsibility; indeed,
we could even believe inclusion in social responsibility indexes involves
misguided, but well-intentioned, distraction from profit-maximization. In
this descriptive form, the interpretation does not necessarily implicate a
normative claim about the financial or social value of entrenchment.
Second, this interpretation permits a more realistic understanding of
accountability to profits in the first place. Managers have discretion
regardless of specific governance provisions because profit-maximization
proves a concept as amorphous as social responsibility performance.133
128

Walker, supra note [], at 598-600 (reviewing the literature).
See generally id. (reviewing arguments and concluding many non-traditional forms
of compensation not only are inefficient but also additive in their ability to increase total
managerial wealth).
130
See Margolis et al., supra note 10.
131
Such lack of transparency has efficiency implications for corporate welfare as well.
See generally Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1 (arguing managers use less transparent forms
of compensation to hide egregious rent extraction).
132
See Manda Salls, Why We Don’t Study Corporate Responsibility, Harv. Bus. Sch.
Working Knowledge (May 17, 2004)(interviewing Professor Margolis). Professor
Margolis observes:
Sustaining research attention on both the ethical and economic
responsibilities of business, and on the tensions between them, shapes the
orientation we inculcate to business school students about their role and
responsibilities. They are not merely agents of shareholders. They are leaders and
trustees of perhaps the most significant institutions in the contemporary era. How
managers see themselves and understand their role is an important contributing
factor to their ethical conduct. Scholarly attention to ethics and values does indeed
have an impact on business leaders’ self-conception and resulting behavior.
133
See Chen & Hanson, supra note 103, at 91-99. Further, not all of our entrenching
provisions necessarily lead to fewer beneficial control transactions. As discussed at note
44, golden parachutes may incentivize managers to sell their corporations. This leaves
129

10-Mar-06]

Entrenched Managers

27

Profits, as discussed above, come in many forms; profit-maximization,
therefore, becomes more of an art than a science, with profit-maximization
under social standards a supreme act of artistry. Often, general corporate
laws ensure such discretion persists across the board. For example, both
Delaware and the Revised Model Business Code provide only the directors
can initiate and place on the shareholder ballot charter amendments and
merger proposals.134 This serious restriction to shareholder power applies
regardless of whether the corporation has any of our “entrenchment”
provisions. Thus, even managers “accountable” to shareholders, and
therefore “accountable” to profit-making, probably can pursue social
agendas within these confines if they perceive their roles in this manner.135
A key element, then, could be the perception of accountability, and not just
accountability itself.
As with other interpretations, introducing greater complexity raises
questions. Managers operate in a much larger context than the presence of a
few corporate governance provisions.
How, for example, do the
corporations of entrenched managers handle shareholder proposals? What
kind of internal audits do they conduct? Where are their headquarters?
What business schools did entrenched managers attend, if they attended any
at all? To what social clubs do these managers belong? And so on. We
might infer from our results the possibility that these six entrenching
governance provisions are conspicuous indications of a much broader, as
yet unexamined, situation that affects managerial accountability to
shareholders and, perhaps, society as a whole. Much of this, however,
remains conjecture, and takes its place alongside other interpretations as a
plausible piece of the picture.
CONCLUSION
Managers accountable to shareholders, takeover markets and, in the end,
profits, are also accountable to two prominent investment indexes based on
social responsibility performance. Interpretations of such results range
from hurrah to humbug. Perhaps socially responsible practices are also
profitable. Perhaps managers accountable to shareholders also feel
accountable to others generally.
Or maybe these managers just appear
socially responsible, having deceptively gamed the system. From the
original, more social-psychological hypothesis, each of these interpretations
likely reflects part of the picture, but the takeaway should be an overlooked
open the question why such provisions necessarily reduce firm value.
134
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aspect of corporate governance–the extent to which governance
arrangements might affect the social role of the manager playing his part.
Given the amorphous nature of maximizing profits, managers face a range
of profitable paths, and only some will pursue the more socially responsible
possibilities. This Article suggests governance arrangements that help
construct accountable roles provide some of the impetus toward, at the least,
an awareness of accountability to social interests beyond shareholder
wealth. This may be the case because managers unaccountable to
shareholders have been divorced from their legitimate social roles as
fiduciaries and representatives within the corporate democracy.136 Perhaps
such executives, perched atop the business world, begin to understand
themselves as no longer accountable to anyone.
Regardless, the results underscore the problematic nature of thoroughly
decoupling ownership from control with governance provisions like
staggered boards and limits to amend the corporate charter. This
understanding, however, leaves open the more practical question of reform.
Some might suggest leaving things alone regardless of empirical
evidence.137
Corporations are systems of contracts, an important
contractual relationship being the one between managers and shareholders.
Such relationships reflect the bargains of an open market, and while not
perfect, tinkering with these relationships could cause more harm than
good. Others might simply call for a wholesale prohibition of entrenching
arrangements, which undermine accountability and may not be the product
of legitimate dickering but rather the result of managerial manipulation and
power.138 More nuanced reform might involve ensuring shareholders have
real power, at the very least, to force changes in the underlying rules of the
corporate charter.139 A rather different approach could include greater
judicial recognition of the problems associated with the governance
provisions herein. For example, perhaps courts should be especially careful
in applying doctrines like the business judgment rule in suits involving
corporations with a plethora of entrenchment provisions that have de facto
insulated their managers from accountability to the market.140
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However, any conclusions drawn from these results, as well as results
from prior studies on the financial performance of entrenched managers,
need to be tempered with several caveats in mind. To begin, these results
stem from the study of generally large, always public, corporations. Many
reforms might apply to corporations in general, large or small, private or
public. But private corporations, as well as smaller, public corporations,
subside in an environment quite different from that of the public behemoths
tracked by Dow Jones and FTSE.141 At the same time, the largest of the
behemoths exist in a unique environment as well–corporations like General
Electric simply do not face many takeover threats because of their size
alone. Extending the conclusions of research like mine to such corporations
may not be appropriate without further inquiry.
Another caveat involves a lack of more in-depth case studies. Empirical
evidence generally linking entrenchment with poor financial and social
performance does not give us a complete picture of the actual impact
entrenchment has on society. Although entrenchment may usually lead
managers astray, entrenchment may also enable fundamental innovation in
some cases. Such innovation may not have occurred if the innovators were
tethered to prevailing norms of profit-making and social responsibility. Ben
& Jerry’s, to take an earlier example, was in the vanguard of corporate
social responsibility. Historically, however, the company has been
controlled by insiders through a dual class capitalization structure.142 Ben
& Jerry’s serves as a particularly interesting example for two reasons. First,
we ought to explore the trade-off between the contributions of insulated
innovators and the more widespread decadence of our average entrenched
manager. Second, with Ben & Jerry’s in mind, we might learn that certain
governance arrangements–such as dual classes of stock–are more often
associated with “good” entrenchment, whereas other kinds of
arrangements–such as staggered boards or poison pills–are associated with
“bad” entrenchment.
takeovers with mechanisms like a poison pill. Here I consider an extension of such
intermediate review: judges should be wary of director behavior any time entrenchment
provisions de facto insulate management from shareholder accountability and takeover
markets. The practical effects of such an extension, however, would be limited because
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A final caveat, and perhaps the elephant in the room, regards the
unproven relationship between profits or social responsibility performance
and the slippery idea of societal welfare. Even assuming “maximizing”
“welfare” has real normative meaning,143 and even assuming we could
gather accurate measurements of things like earnings, environmental
pollution and human rights abuses, we would face the overwhelming task of
weighing these interests together in an acceptable manner. Just as profits
alone will not adequately reflect the costs and benefits of a business
endeavor, neither will social responsibility performance. In short, the costs
of doing business come with benefits, and neither profits nor social
responsibility indexes can tell anyone exactly how the scales turn out.
While this Article avoids the broader philosophical and pragmatic debates
in this area, any empirical study should be understood with these questions
in mind.144
These caveats, as well as the competing interpretations I offered earlier,
by no means render policy suggestions about entrenching governance
arrangements futile. As with all research, we are involved in a work in
progress, but must make do with what we have. Thus far a strong case has
been made that certain entrenchment provisions could lead to lower
financial value. From this, among other things, some scholars have argued
for reconsideration of the existing balance of power in U.S. public
corporations. This Article has taken a different approach, linking certain
entrenchment provisions with poor social performance, but has taken a
small step toward reaching the same conclusion.
***
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